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What Animals Teach Us about 
Politics by Brian Massumi. 
Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2014. Pp. 152. $79.95 cloth, 
$22.95 paper.
A fascinating by-product of 
recent interest in vitalist philoso-
phies of becoming—particularly 
in the area of affect theory—has 
been the import of the works of 
English anthropologist–cyberneti-
cist Gregory Bateson, in particular 
his seminal 1972 book Steps to an 
Ecology of Mind. Bateson broke 
down ecology into a series of three 
areas: the material (ecology, bio-
physical); the social (cultural and 
human); and the perceptual, which 
treats the mind as an interactive sys-
tem characterized by an exchange 
of information: “Difference that 
makes a difference,” as he put 
it. Bateson argued for the innate 
interconnection and interpenetra-
tion of the three ecologies to the 
point of always deterritorializating 
them towards an infinite outside 
that guarantees their difference 
and becoming. More importantly, 
this is also a de-hierarchized sys-
tem, where humans are given no 
more preference than nonhumans 
or material objects, and neither is 
raised above the worlding capa-
bilities of nature. In this sense, geo-
morphism, anthropomorphism, 
and biomorphism are equally 
embedded, with the aesthetic act-
ing as a vital catalyst. Bateson’s 
project has a clear connection to 
recent explorations in ecosophical 
aesthetics, in particular the ground-
breaking work of Félix Guattari. 
In Chaosmosis (1992, English 1995), 
The Three Ecologies (1989, English 
2000), and What Is Ecosophy? (2013, 
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English 2018) Guattari developed a 
processual philosophy of the eco-
logical through the use of asignify-
ing components that think beyond 
the conventional split between sub-
ject and object, human and non-
human, subjectivities and world, 
transforming the ecological into 
a machinic, decentered ethico-
aesthetic paradigm, a subjectivity 
without a subject.
Enter Brian Massumi’s What 
Animals Teach Us about Politics 
(2014), which also draws heav-
ily on Bateson but in this case one 
of his more underutilized essays, 
“A Theory of Play and Fantasy” 
(1972).1 Wittily written and rich 
in philosophical scope (in addition 
to Bateson, Deleuze, and Guattari, 
the work encompasses Henri 
Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, 
Giorgio Agamben and Raymond 
Ruyer), Massumi has structured 
his book as a form of practical 
user’s manual geared towards a 
greater, creative vitalism of life (in 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s sense of “that 
dark, driving power that insatiably 
thirsts for itself”).2 The book’s title 
essay is a relatively short reflection 
on animal play as the staging of a 
metacommunicative paradox, an 
expression of difference and sin-
gularity on one hand and, through 
vitality affect, mutual inclusion and 
transindividuality on the other. 
These open-ended, fluid ludic ges-
tures are followed by a series of 
fourteen propositions that act as a 
preliminary sketch for a practical 
philosophy (in Baruch Spinoza’s 
sense) “to be Filled in according to 
Appetite” (38). Massumi fills out 
the second half of the book with 
three supplementary essays that 
apply Bateson’s ludic principles to 
(a) writing, where, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, the human 
“becomes-animal” most intently 
(specifically through the role of 
the “anomalous” in Franz Kafka’s 
Metamorphosis [1915] and Herman 
Melville’s Moby Dick [1851]); (b) the 
zoological reduction of the animal 
to an object of spectatorship (via a 
constructed zone of indifference), 
and the concomitant need for a 
mutual inclusion of the animal and 
the human via an enactive, sym-
pathetic gesture of double deter-
ritorialization (producing a zone 
of indiscernibility of difference); 
and (c), lest one fall into abhor-
rent speciesism and anthropomor-
phism, “Six Theses on the Animal 
to be Avoided” (91). Massumi’s 
main objective in the supplements 
is to open a gap between Bateson’s 
original theory of animal play and 
the affirmative politics that might 
flow from it, whereby “[o]nly an 
enactive ecology of a diversity of 
animal practices, in a creative ten-
sion of differential mutual inclu-
sion, can begin to do the trick” (89, 
his emphasis).
So what does Bateson’s theory of 
play consist of, and how does it force 
us to rethink the very nature of 
instinct and, by extension, politics? 
Firstly, as Massumi points out, we 
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must rethink the human as imma-
nent to animality, for “[e]xpress-
ing the singular belonging of the 
human to the animal continuum 
has political implications, as do all 
questions of belonging” (3). This 
entails moving beyond anthropo-
morphism, not just in relation to 
animals, but also to ourselves as 
standing apart from other animals, 
“our inveterate vanity regarding 
our assumed species identity, based 
on the specious grounds of our 
sole proprietorship of language, 
thought, and creativity” (3). In this 
sense, Massumi’s project has obvi-
ous Spinozist roots, attempting to 
construct an animal politics and 
carry it to the limit of what it can 
do by forging new rhizomic con-
nections with other bodies through 
a combination of sympathy and 
creativity. In this respect, the proj-
ect begins and ends in play.
For Bateson, animal play revolves 
around the reciprocal imbrication 
of differencings through mutual 
inclusion in a process of contin-
ual variation. Massumi illustrates 
this through an analysis of a play 
fight between wolf cubs, which is 
similar to (through abstraction) its 
analogue, actual combat, whereby 
“[e]ach ludic gesture envelops a 
difference in a display of simi-
larity” (4). Similar to, but not the 
Same. In short, the ludic gesture 
stages a paradox whereby a wolf 
cub bites and at the same time 
says, “This is not a bite, this is not 
a fight, this is a game,” standing 
in for the suspended analogue: 
real combat. “In a single gesture,” 
argues Massumi, “two individuals 
are swept up together and move in 
tandem to a register of existence 
where what matters is no longer 
what one does, but what one does 
stands-for” (5).
This level of abstraction is game’s 
“-esqueness,” its metacommuni-
cative level that self-reflexively 
mobilizes the possible, a situation 
(or in Deleuze and Guattari’s ter-
minology, a people) to come as vital 
gesture. In this sense, metacom-
munication precedes its denotative 
communication, for the latter needs 
the prehuman level as a precondi-
tion for language: “Animal play 
creates the conditions for language. 
Its metacommunicative action 
builds the evolutionary foundation 
for the metalinguistic functions 
that will be the hallmark of human 
language, and which distinguish it 
from a simple code” (8). As Bateson 
himself ludically puts it, “These 
actions in which we now engage do 
not denote what those actions for 
which they stand would denote.”3 In 
this sense, the ludic gesture meta-
communicates: it comments on 
what it’s doing as it does it—“I’m 
not biting, I’m nipping”—thereby 
opening the analogical gap, but at 
the same time the gesture’s abstrac-
tion puts into play a conditional 
difference. Combat is also present 
but held in suspense by the stylism 
of the play and its ludic logic (not 
unlike the prerehearsed moves in 
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professional wrestling). The result 
is a zone of indiscernibility without 
differences being erased: game and 
combat are performatively fused 
without being confused, their dif-
ferences actively coming together.
This is another way of saying 
that ludic gestures produce tran-
sindividual transformation via 
a performative act while at the 
same time retaining their affec-
tive force across the ludic divide. 
Thus, the power of affect in the 
abstraction is no less profound 
than that in its analogue: the play 
bite can induce just as much fear 
as its combat equivalent. What is 
important here, however, is what 
Massumi calls “the included mid-
dle” (35). When play and combat 
come together, their union creates 
a third  dimension—the included 
middle of their mutual influence. 
However, animals and humans 
react differently to this mutual 
interface. While humans experi-
ence paradox as a breakdown of the 
capacity to think—which causes 
agitation and, in extreme cases, 
paranoia—animals are activated by 
it: in play the animal actively and 
effectively affirms paradox, rais-
ing its actions to a metacommuni-
cative level where it prepares itself 
for the rigors of combat by having 
rehearsed the moves in advance.
So how might this be a lesson in 
politics? Because the ludic presup-
poses collaboration or, as Massumi 
argues, “The ludic gesture is impo-
tent unless it captures the other’s 
attention” (35). By  anticipating the 
partner’s countermoves, point and 
counterpoint generate a mutual 
inclusion that might be dubbed 
“sympathy” or, alternatively, 
“primary consciousness” (36). 
“Sympathy is the transindivid-
ual becoming brought into being 
by intuition’s acting out,” notes 
Massumi. “Sympathy is the mode 
of existence of the included middle” 
(35, his emphasis). As the think-
ing–doing of life, sympathy thus 
plays out (and at) the in-between, 
but immanently from the inside, 
not from an outside overview (like 
cognition). In other words, this is 
not a dialectical move but rather 
a genealogical one, in Nietzsche’s 
sense of unearthing the origins of 
bodily forces.
Ultimately, and this is per-
haps Massumi’s key point and 
what brings him most clearly 
into alignment with Guattari’s 
ecosophy, is that what animals 
teach us about politics is the phil-
osophical equivalent of play’s 
 metacommunication—namely, 
metamodelization. According to 
Guattari, metamodelization reori-
ents theoretical activity by taking 
into account the diversity and inter-
connectedness of modeling systems 
themselves. It is by its very nature 
transindividual: “I have proposed 
the concept of ontological inten-
sity. It implies an ethico-aesthetic 
engagement with the enunciative 
assemblage, both in actual and vir-
tual  registers. But another element 
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of the metamodelisation proposed 
here resides in the collective char-
acter of machinic multiplicities.”4 
In short, metamodelization privi-
leges the primacy of the supernor-
mal tendency in animal life so that, 
as Massumi concludes,
What we learn from animals 
is the possibility of construct-
ing what Guattari calls an 
ethico-aesthetic paradigm of 
natural politics (as opposed to 
a politics of nature). The idea 
of natural politics has been 
well and truly debunked 
by critical thinking over 
the last century. Now it is 
time to relaunch it, well and 
-esquely—marshaling all the 
powers that the false nature 
provides.” (38, his emphasis)
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